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Abstract 
 
Rationale, aims and objectives: To find out how medical practitioners perceive the processes of decision-making in the 
context of the individual patient and to examine the importance of decision- making in the development and identity of 
medical practitioners throughout their clinical lives and to suggest how these perceptions might influence medical peda-
gogy. 
Method:  A qualitative study of medical practitioners of varying ages and specialties, using loosely structured biographical 
interviews that were read to determine the different ways in which decisions were constructed and recalled and the impact 
these decisions were felt to have on both the decision-maker and others for whom the decision was salient. 
Results:  Personal decisions about career choice were important because they shaped the life of the practitioner and made a 
significant impact on those around them. Professional decisions were made in the domains of the mechanistic and probabil-
istic scientific world of medicine and in the domain of human relationships, emotions and suffering. There was often a ten-
sion between the different domains and the context of the life-world often modified decisions that might logically have been 
determined by evidence-based medicine and its bio-knowledge.  
Conclusions: Decisions had a strong effect on the development of identity within the field of practice. Individuals came to 
see themselves as doctors who made certain kinds of decisions of immediate relevance to the individual patient. Teaching 
medical students and graduates how to apply evidence to their decisions and how to use formal computational decision aids 
may well have a useful place in pedagogy, but the impact of decision-making on the lives of doctors and their individual 
patients deserves at least equal emphasis. 
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Introduction 
 
Those with an interest in formal decision analysis have 
found rich soil in the field of medicine, because so much of 
medical practice is concerned with decisions and with the 
exercise of critical judgement [1-16]. Attempts to ensure 
quality, coherence and standardisation of medical decision-
making have led to the development of algorithms for evi-
dence-based practice and decision-aids, or decision trees 
that would enable clinicians reliably and consistently to 
select tests or therapies that produce the ‘best’ outcomes 
according to the ‘best’ evidence - the branch with the best 
score indicating the ‘right’ decision. While many refine-
ments of this consequentialist approach have been advo-
cated, including ones that incorporate possible regret [17] 
and values [18,19], it remains unclear how well such deci-
sion aids or computational approaches to decision-making 
accurately capture the decision-making processes of clini-
cians in their day-to-day work and the meaning of deci-
sion-making in the personal and professional lives of the 
doctors themselves. 
In addition to their clear role as outcomes of a delib-
erative or logical process of reasoning, decisions are also 
widely recognised as playing a significant part in personal 
development and enculturation [11,16,20-24]. Teaching 
students and graduates how to make appropriate decisions 
using the special knowledge of medical discourse is, there-
fore, a major part of the telos of medical education. Impart-
ing knowledge and acquiring it are both essential, but de-
ploying it through decision-making is the mark of the ‘fin-
ished’ student, the graduate, the expert. Successful de-
ployment is expertise. We talk about the role of ‘experi-
ence’ as though we absorb its lessons by osmosis [25,26]. 
But experiential learning is more than a passive process. 
Decisions mark most experiences – to go there, to take part 
in that, to stay rather than to go, to yield or resist, even to 
survive or die. We actively seek the experiences of profes-
sional involvement, of aesthetic engagement, of travel, of 
relationships. We ‘take’ or even ‘seize’ opportunities by 
deciding.  
Decisions, therefore, are critical experiences [27] , and 
they shape our sense of self, our personal and professional 
identities, both in our own eyes and in the eyes of others. 
They contribute to the intricate complex of our moral 
selves. There are adventures that seize us – natural disas-
ters, crimes, wars, random events – but even when the ship 
sinks or the countryside catches fire we must decide.  
Decisions are also the nub of regrets [1,17,25,26,28-
38]. After making a decision with a negative outcome, we 
may resolve never to make a particular mistake again – we 
learn from a retrospective regret. Risk aversion is the habit 
of anticipating and avoiding choices that may lead to future 
regret – an impossible avoidance at times, but a habit that 
contributes significantly to a sense of identity [27,39]. As 
sources of potential regret and as critical experiences, deci-
sions also contribute to our moral development [27,30]. 
While enormous attention has been devoted to the 
place that evidence plays in decision-making and the de-
gree to which clinical decisions adhere to accepted scien-
tific and professional norms, much less is known about the 
ways in which doctors actually perceive the processes in-
volved in making decisions and how decisions shape their 
personal and professional lives. We report the results of a 
qualitative study of the values and formative experiences 
of clinicians of varying ages, backgrounds and specialties, 
seeking to draw out of their narratives references to their 
decisions and the ways in which decision-making contrib-
utes to their development and identity.  
 
Methods and materials 
 
In this study, medical practitioners associated with the 
Sydney Medical School (Sydney, Australia) were invited 
to reflect upon their perceptions of the ways in which val-
ues matter in their practices and their educational experi-
ences. Interviews were semi-structured, with participants 
encouraged to reflect on episodes in their careers that had 
stayed in their minds because of their moral dimensions. 
They were also asked to talk about specific issues such as 
the cost of healthcare, the availability of health services, 
the adequacy  of education provided by the medical cur-
riculum that they had received or were teaching, the place 
of evidence and research in medical education and practice 
and the impact of role models and mentors. Interviews 
were conducted by a medical practitioner and a psychology 
graduate, either together or separately. All interviews were 
anonymised with coded numbers used for each participant. 
Ethical clearances were obtained from the University of 
Sydney.  
Participants included 7 women and 12 men aged from 
28 to 76 from 9 different medical specialties. Transcripts 
were thematically coded for ‘decision-making’ and a proc-
ess of dialectical empiricism [40] used to categorise the 
emergent themes into more abstract concepts, using con-
stant comparison [41-46] and reformulation of research 
questions and theories [47]. Agreement about themes, 
codes and categories was reached at regular meetings of 
the research group. The research group characterised dis-
course about decisions by reference to processes of choice, 
whether made about personal life, career or medical prac-
tice.  
The selected quotes in the Results section give typical 
examples emerging from the data.  
 
Results 
 
Personal decisions 
 
Entry into medicine 
 
Not surprisingly, the original decision to choose medicine 
as a career is highly salient - even to those who have been 
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in practice for many years. P12, a surgeon, is devoted to 
his clinical practice, but recognises its huge personal de-
mands. He warns against deciding to enter medicine solely 
because of its perceived intellectual challenge: 
 
P12. It can be very satisfying, but it’s a real life. It’s 
not a career, it’s more than a career if you want to 
do it well, and that’s where your satisfaction will be.  
If you want to do it as a job, it’s enormously frustrat-
ing and time consuming and exhausting, both emo-
tionally and physically.  So either you’ve really got to 
say ‘This is going to engulf my life, and then I will 
get enjoyment out of the frustrations’ and that.  But if 
you did it just for a career because it was hard to get 
into and it meant I’m bright, then I think it’s not.  It’s 
a humanity. 
   
P7 has a family background of professional excellence 
and in a sense his decision to enter medicine was prede-
termined. But there is another side to his nature, his habi-
tus, determined by his interest in social justice. His deci-
sions and choices, his exempla, all reflect this commit-
ment: 
 
P7.  I’m a hereditary doctor – I come from a medical 
family, and one with quite a long history of being in-
volved in medical fields of one sort or other.  So if I 
go over to PA where I was a resident, I could look on 
the walls and see my father and my grandfather in 
the photos of residents and superintendents and 
things like that… And having an interest in social 
justice, in equity issues or things like that, also I sup-
pose inclined me towards medicine as a way of being 
able to put that forward and put my interests for-
ward. 
   
P8, by contrast, defies her family history to do medi-
cine: 
 
P8.  No family members at all.  My parents both left 
school at 13, and no one had ever been to university 
until my older sister said she’d like to be a school 
teacher.  And nobody in my generation, we now have 
one person in the next generation in medicine, but 
that’s it. 
 
Subsequent career choices 
 
The choice of specialty is also something that partici-
pants describe at length. Some, like P14, must find their 
definitive careers by trial and error: 
 
P14.  I passed the physicians’ exam, the writtens and 
the clinicals first go, so that was quite good from my 
point of view.  And then decided to do nuclear medi-
cine and ultrasound, and quickly realised after about 
the first two weeks, I thought this isn’t the right thing 
for me.  So the question was how I extricated myself 
out of that whilst maintaining some of the skill-base 
that I actually developed, particularly in ultrasound 
and imaging…So I continued that for another two 
years to complete that diploma, and then moved to 
endocrine training, and did a year of clinical and 
then the rest of the time was a PhD and completed 
that advance training.  So by about ’87 I’d finished 
all of that… 
 
P5, by contrast, always followed a direct path to a cho-
sen career, recognising a strong motivation to become a 
surgeon: 
 
P5.  Then I was an intern, I went straight into intern-
ship, and I knew very early, again, that I wanted to 
do surgery, I decided that pretty much as a medical 
student, so I did my surgical primary and my intern 
year, and followed a pretty routine pathway into sur-
gical training, I did the required number of years, 
then applied, and more or less got the position 
straight away, then became a surgical registrar and 
did my surgical training, and everything just sort of 
flowed along.  
 
The importance of authenticity features heavily in 
these accounts.  P11 believes that there is a place in medi-
cine for all kinds of personality: 
 
P11. So if you don’t deal well with patients, you can 
go into pathology. If you really want to do caring and 
sharing stuff, even though psychiatrists aren’t very 
good at it, then go off to do psychiatry.  I don’t think 
there is a core personality that makes you a doctor, 
or more a better doctor.   
 
P6 has found the importance of following genuine in-
clinations, rather than becoming trapped in a pre-
determined career path: 
 
P6. So I left [hospital X], under a sort of lot of 
‘You’re ruining your life, your life will be over’.  
That said, the few people I did consider significant 
mentors, many of whom were surgeons (and I’d al-
ways enjoyed surgery), but I knew that that wasn’t 
my ultimate career destination.  But the people who I 
saw as really good people were the ones who said 
‘Oh we think you’ll be a great rural GP. Go off, have 
fun’.   
 
Career decisions are also shaped by participants’ per-
sonal interest in worlds outside traditional clinical practice. 
P5 and P11 both recognise the existence of life beyond 
clinical medicine, and the need to acknowledge other de-
sires and ambitions: 
 
P5. The madness is working ridiculous hours, putting 
work ahead of family, getting up at 5.00am to go 
rowing, sending emails at 2.00am, just that sort of 
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thing, thinking ‘Why would you do all that when 
you’ve got all this other stuff on your plate?’   
 
P11.  I guess you’re dead for a long time, so it’s 
something I wanted to do.  I guess there was a little 
bit of ‘I want to achieve something outside of medi-
cine’.  So I finished that.  Then I went and worked for 
the AMA [Australian Medical Association], so that 
was lobbying and policy development, and that was 
in Canberra 
 
Professional decisions 
 
In their day-to-day professional lives, clinicians make 
decisions in two different worlds, the world of bio-
knowledge and the life-world. By bio-knowledge, we mean 
the kind of knowledge that practitioners have of the work-
ings of the body, its anatomy, biochemistry and physiol-
ogy, together with the probabilistic knowledge of evi-
dence-based medicine (EBM). Knowledge of the life-
world refers to the knowledge of human behaviour, rela-
tionships, interests and suffering that are essential to the 
practice of medicine.  
 
Bio-knowledge 
 
Because bio-knowledge represents the science of medicine, 
the basic knowledge of bodily structure and function and 
the evidence that supports particular treatments, advocates 
of EBM naturally advocate its observance and implementa-
tion in the course of clinical decision-making. P2 does so 
with the caveat that the individual patient’s welfare is al-
ways paramount: 
 
P2.  Um, well I think there are two components, the 
one is improvement in the way evidence is used to 
develop policy, and I think probably the more impor-
tant one is individual clinicians’ understanding of 
evidence, and how to use it for decision making.  And 
by evidence, I mean, I think the critical paradigm 
there is the weighing up of benefits of harms.  
  
Making a clinical decision that proves to be ‘wrong’ in 
terms of bio-knowledge is, of course, a dreadful thing to 
live with, but errors provide evidence, warnings about 
what not to do in future decisions. Regret is a powerful 
stimulus to thought and self-evaluation, and regrettable 
decisions may at times be made into wider teaching: 
 
P15.  Things that I’ve done?  The things that I re-
member are the cases that I’ve done the wrong thing 
and it’s awful.  You just feel sick, just terrible.  But I 
was doing night shift one night and I had a pregnant 
woman who went into respiratory failure, and I 
didn’t know why, and I’d treated her for the wrong 
thing and I just felt terrible.  Then it was like one of 
those cases that was put up for grand rounds as an 
example of what not to do in a night shift, and trying 
to teach everybody else, but I felt terrible. 
 
Life-world 
 
But doctors also work continually in the ‘life-world’, the 
world of values and human relationships, of individual 
differences, nuances and cultural preferences: 
 
P9.  I think the preferences and attitudes and values 
of the person who is the patient, they are obviously 
critically important. And I think drawing that EBM 
picture with the evidence and the person’s circum-
stances and their preferences. I don’t know if I’ve 
just brainwashed myself into thinking that’s actually 
the way.  But I think that’s actually quite a good 
model.  
  
Tensions  
 
Working in two worlds of knowing inevitably brings ten-
sions. EBM (bio-knowledge) tends to produce protocols 
that express epidemiological evidence about ‘best prac-
tice’, but doctors often find themselves faced by contextual 
nuances when they deal with individual patients and can-
not easily ‘generalise’ the results of empirical research to 
the core of individual people. Even those devoted to ‘sci-
entific medicine’ and evidence-based practice feel the ten-
sion: 
 
P9. It’s so hard, because at a macro level I think it 
actually is very scientific.  But I think when you look 
at the individual bits and pieces of it, it can seem 
much less so because there are so many other con-
siderations on a patient to patient basis 
 
As do those whose first concern is for the human wel-
fare of their patients: 
 
P10. I’m a quality of life believer, so improve the 
quantity and quality of life.  And empathetic, in an 
evidence-based way.  And I suppose also to be re-
sponsible for health resources as well. Be conscious 
of the whole unit, how it fits in with the whole econ-
omy and the universe and those sorts of things.  It’s a 
very hard general sort of question, isn’t it?  
 
Balance is seen to be an important way of resolving 
these tensions between bio-knowledge and life-world ori-
ented decision-making. 
 
P12.  I think a lot of our decisions are not based on 
scientific evidence, but I mean medicine is a human-
ity, and it is a balance of science and non-science in 
a way, and I think you’ve got to work out what the 
balance is...So I think you should always know the 
science, but be able to look at it critically.  And the 
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more you are better at looking at that, the more you 
realise how poor it is sometimes, and then you can 
make that decision. 
 
‘Kind of doctor’ 
 
Decision-making is a powerful way to fashion identity. 
Doctors identify themselves in part by their pattern of deci-
sion-making, as ‘that kind of doctor’ who makes ‘that kind 
of decision.’ P9 identifies himself as conservative and as 
making his decisions within guidelines: 
 
P9. Yeah, probably I’m reasonably conservative 
anyway, and also I do spend a substantial amount of 
time talking about the options with people before-
hand, so there probably aren’t that many things 
where I really feel that I’ve done something that was 
kind of way out of standard, or against… 
 
P6, by contrast, identifies himself as a person who 
works away from prevailing views, but does so with 
due and appropriate thought about context and conse-
quences: 
 
P6.  So I’ve often done things that were counter to 
what the prevailing view was in terms of what you 
should do in terms of a medical career and never re-
gretted it. And I think probably because it’s not 
something I did. I’m not a rash person, I don’t make 
rash decisions, so if I do something that seems a bit 
unusual, I’ve thought through it.   
 
P19, a younger practitioner, acknowledges that intui-
tion drives his decisions, but that evidence modifies 
and informs his actual practice because of the kind of 
person he is: 
 
P19.  Naturally I think I am much more of an activist, 
a more intuition driven person, I impose these rules 
so I don’t get too unsafe with my practice.  And being 
from that spectrum, so I’m better with communica-
tion and those kind of things, then personally I need 
to make sure I set myself rules, ‘This is how I’m go-
ing to deal with this’ so that I run the scientific path-
way and don’t miss things.   
 
P13 presents himself as a rebel, an innovator, a pioneer. 
His identity is bound to these perceptions of himself: 
 
P13.  And you know that I was the first person to ever 
do [certain operations] and you probably don’t know 
that I was censured…  It didn’t stop me... I get a lot 
of opposition for doing operations for the first time.  
 
 
 
 
Inhibited decisions 
 
Bureaucracy  
 
Bureaucracy powerfully influences modern lives in all 
their ramifications and medicine is no exception. For most 
doctors, bureaucracy is an enemy, potential enemy or 
source of tension over decisions about ‘best practice’. 
Some doctors, however, embrace bureaucracy because 
they see it as one way to ensure better, more efficient and 
fairer practice. Decisions about relationship to bureaucracy 
mark individual doctors as ‘conformers’ who make the 
best of the rules of their field of practice, or ‘resisters’ who 
argue with, dispute and sometimes contravene, those rules. 
Others are ‘fatalists’, who simply try to work within con-
straints. P5 adopts a certain fatalism toward bureaucracy, 
believing it too powerful to fight: 
 
P5.  I don’t have a great optimism that the things that 
I do, or we all do, make a great deal of difference.  
We write, we complain, we bring it to the notice of 
the relevant administrators; it’s a perennial problem.  
So I do feel a certain amount of powerlessness about 
changing that…  
 
P7 is angrier, more reactive, toward a particular bu-
reaucrat, whom he considers to embody the worst of 
health governance: 
 
P7. And the CEO lies directly to the people that … 
about the budgetary independence. He’s been ex-
traordinarily destructive, not only to mental health, 
but to other aspects of the provision of health. And he 
is a lying, conniving bully.  
 
P14, however, has become a bureaucrat, a senior ad-
ministrator who would wish to persuade his colleagues 
to conform: 
 
P14.  I think the profession as a whole has become a 
little bit cleverer in the sense of how to do that.  They 
still rationalise that it’s for the patient’s benefit.  In 
the overall scheme of things there’s very little under-
standing that this is the tax-payer’s dollars we’re 
spending generally, and somehow we’re going to 
have to account for that sooner or later back to the 
community that funds us. 
   
Our results reveal that for many medical practitioners, 
decisions are a powerful means to establish identity. They 
tell of personal decisions that include the choices involved 
in entering medicine and in fashioning careers. They make 
professional decisions in their daily work that involve both 
bio-knowledge and knowledge of the life-world. They ac-
knowledge the tensions that develop between these two 
domains, and they recognise that each decision contributes 
to the kind of doctor they become. They talk also about the 
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ways that bureaucracies inhibit decision making, and they 
respond to these inhibitions with fatalism, resistance or 
conformity.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Doctors make decisions all their working lives, but they do 
not seem to use the decision aids and computational tech-
niques of formal decision analysis in their professional 
work [7,9,48]. Instead, when they speak of their decisions - 
including those using bio-knowledge - they frame them as 
insights, examples of moral quandaries, confirmations of 
professional competence, justifications of personal values 
and as bearing on the life-world of themselves or others. 
The life-world decisions they make – about career, family, 
relationships and ‘humane’ decisions in practice – are re-
membered and narrated as critical episodes in a life course.  
In medicine, it is frequently impossible to dissociate 
the domains of life-world and bio-knowledge in the deci-
sions made by doctors every day. Personal life-world con-
siderations influence the scope of use for a doctor’s bio-
knowledge. Bio-knowledge decisions, in turn influence the 
life-worlds of others, while their success or failure deter-
mine the reputation of the practitioner and his relationships 
with peers, patients, standards of practice, statutes and so 
on. There is a constant dialectic between the interlocked 
parts of a practitioner’s life. 
We emphasise that we did not specifically ask inter-
viewees how they make clinical decisions (although we 
recognised that clinical decision-making is central to their 
roles and practices). We simply asked people about their 
lives and careers and they spontaneously told us about the 
kinds of decisions that they made, decisions that they in-
terpreted as exempla of the development and enactment of 
their professional moral selves.  They did this unprompted. 
And when we asked them for memorable episodes, deci-
sions figured prominently in the stories they told. For these 
reasons we are  much less concerned, in interpreting our 
findings, with the pre-existent work on medical decision-
making, including diagnosis and its errors 
[3,4,6,9,13,15,18,49,50], than we are with the function of 
narrative as retrospective meaning-making [51-60].  
In understanding the descriptions of decisions pro-
vided by our participants we have made use of Bourdieu’s 
concepts of habitus and field [39]. We construe habitus to 
mean the person produced by genetic make-up, condi-
tioned by the family and culture in which they develop. It 
is the result of explicit and explicit education, physical and 
mental attributes and experiences encountered during de-
velopment. Field we interpret as the domain in which a 
person lives and fulfils a role. One person inhabits multiple 
fields – family, work, recreations, shared interests, and so 
on. For our purposes, field in this study embraces the do-
main of medical practice and its specialisations. Field 
modifies habitus, habitus expresses and modifies field. 
Doctors bring their habitus into the field of medicine and 
each acts on and modifies the other. Field also endows a 
person with social capital, a position in the wider commu-
nity from which to operate. By seeing themselves as enti-
tled to be a particular kind of doctor, our participants con-
firm the social capital that comes from their membership in 
the field of medicine 
With this interpretive framework in mind, it is not sur-
prising that interviewees should feature decisions and their 
moral significance in their biographical narratives, because 
decision-making is a fundamental part of their enactments 
within their professional field-enactments that are judged 
by patients and peers alike – and because decisions must 
reflect choices between the professional and personal 
spheres. This construction of decisions asks us to share 
meaning and moral significance with people whose profes-
sional identity and standing are based on the ‘rightness’ 
and appropriateness of their decisions. Therefore we hear 
about meaning, context and life-world impact, about regret 
and its avoidance and not about the formal processes by 
which decisions are reached. 
Decisions are also biographically constructed in reflec-
tion as means to demonstrate what sort of doctor the narra-
tor has become, the habitus operating within the field of 
medicine [39]. P2, for example, has become the kind of 
person who wants to harness information in order to allow 
doctors to choose treatments that will avoid harm; P5 is the 
kind of doctor who accepts with fatalism the constraints of 
bureaucracy; P7 is a hereditary doctor committed to social 
justice; P8 has no family tradition of medicine, but chose 
medicine as her career; P12 is one who guides his deci-
sions by science when he can, while acknowledging that 
many decisions have their grounding in human relation-
ships and individual judgement; P13 is a polymath, a rebel 
whose decisions are based in his own faith in his own gifts; 
P5 and P7 are people who have decided to resist bureauc-
racy when they can; while P14 seeks to persuade people 
that bureaucracy leads to greater equity and to rational 
governance. 
What is novel about this work is to find that decisions 
are such central means for fashioning identity, such exem-
pla of moral position and development, such important 
validators of ‘goodness’ in the field of action, such mani-
fests of habitus. A doctor’s reputation, especially with pa-
tients, depends as much on the ‘style’ of his or her deci-
sions as on their rightness. Work from Japan and the 
United States among young adults, for example, shows 
different preferences for decision-making style, but clear 
recognition of its importance [61]. EBM defines the spec-
trum of results that doctors should be able to achieve, but 
has to leave room for the individual skill and wisdom with 
which a doctors deploys the knowledge-base [62].  There 
may, for example, be several ways to deal with advanced 
cancer. One oncologist may decide what is ‘best’ for cer-
tain kinds of patient and advise a milder palliation, while 
another, also deciding what is ‘best’, suggests a more ag-
gressive approach and recommends major surgery. Neither 
is wrong or right, but each will develop a particular reputa-
tion, one for consideration and acceptance of limitations, 
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the other for never giving up. Both may be assessed by 
peers as good in their individual ways. Those who refer 
patients to them will do so because of their reputations as 
particular kinds of doctor. That assessment is based on 
their decision habits or decision styles.  
The identity of a professional is, therefore, inextricably 
bound to and shaped by decisions. Each time someone 
recounts a decision, he is saying implicitly ‘I chose to do 
this because I am a person of such a kind.’ This implica-
tion attaches to decisions in their broadest application, to 
self-referential decisions regarding career, to professional 
decisions that reflect the kind of practitioner who makes 
such decisions and to the decisions of others who are ad-
mired or criticised. Decisions in this broad context may 
reflect intelligence, wisdom, knowledge, empathy, inter-
subjectivity, intuition and may therefore contain both cog-
nitive and ethical components. They place interviewees 
culturally, professionally and personally. In ethical terms, 
decisions are moral not, simply because of the decision 
made or the outcome(s) achieved, but because they exem-
plify cardinal virtues of medical practice [63] – prudence, 
phronesis, courage, temperance, justice, faith, hope, char-
ity. 
The stories told by the  clinicians in this study reveal 
that decisions made in clinical practice do not fit neatly 
with older decision theories [7,9,10,14,16,64]. They are 
acts of will that attempt to produce the best outcome for 
everyone involved in the clinical transaction, something 
that is acknowledged in more recent writings on clinical 
decision making [2,5,13,50,61,65-70]. The assessment of 
‘best’ seems  to rest in a more intuitive appreciation of 
individual context than in the calculated probabilities of 
decision trees [71]. The decisions described by the medical 
practitioners in our study illustrate how clinical practice is 
characterised not by uniformity or certainty, but by  excep-
tions and uncertainty, and how clinical decisions inevitably 
are driven by the desire to provide benefit and avoid  regret 
[17,30,34,38]. While the clinicians in this study did not 
describe making precise estimates of benefit, cost or regret 
in the course of their decision-making, each of these fac-
tors had a major influence on their decisions. P15 summa-
rises the power of regret about prior wrong decisions when 
she reflects that ‘You just feel sick, just terrible’ at the re-
alisation of a significant error. 
Decisions are essential components of identity, both as 
habitus  and as field [39]. Decisions construct identity in 
dialectics between life-world and bio-knowledge, confor-
mity and resistance, boldness and restraint, perceptions of 
role-models and of villains, individuality and collegiality – 
between apparent dichotomies that repeatedly ask people 
to place themselves somewhere along a scale between ex-
tremes. Decisions have moral attributes. They are some-
times presented as the result of fundamental dispositions of 
character [72], and sometimes as acts of will [73]. There 
are many attributes and acquisitions that contribute to as-
sessments of a person’s reputation and to the trust that oth-
ers are prepared to give her, but habits of decision are vital 
to the reputation of and the trust invested in a medical 
practitioner. 
While this study is confined to the perceptions and ex-
periences of clinicians associated with one medical school 
in Sydney, Australia, we suggest that the insights it pro-
vides are likely to have broad resonance with other medical 
centres and almost certainly for other professions. Deci-
sions that influence other people’s lives and welfare cannot 
be reduced  solely to decision trees, even those that allow 
for values [19], because decisions so profoundly affect the 
decision-makers and their evolving identity, as well as the 
present and future of decision-recipients. Decisions have 
immediate effects, but their delayed ones require time, 
further experience and reflection that cannot be captured 
by any simple algorithm. Teaching about decisions in 
medicine at least needs to recognise, acknowledge and 
make manifest the life-shaping impacts of decision-
making. 
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